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Thou Good and Faithful Servant 
by Carl E. Schneider 
Lawmakers are stewards of social resources. A current debate-over 
screening newborns for genetic 
disorders-illuminates dilemmas of 
that stewardship that have particularly 
plagued bioethics. Recently in the Re-
port, Mary Ann Baily and Thomas 
Murray told the story oflittle Ben Hay-
good. He died from MCADD, a genet-
ic disorder that can make long fasting 
fatal. 1 Screening at birth would have let 
doctors alert Ben's parents. "After Ben 
died," Baily and Murray wrote, "his fa-
ther became a passionate advocate for 
expanding Mississippi's newborn 
screening program to add MCADD 
and other disorders." Soon, the Ben 
Haygood Comprehensive Newborn 
Screening Act increased the number of 
genetic disorders covered by the state's 
program from five to forty and provided 
teams to follow up positive tests. 
Is this a prudent and productive way 
to make public policy? Certainly it is 
understandable. Mr. Haywood knew 
that parents suffered and children died 
in ways newborn screening could pre-
vent. He acted on his knowledge. The 
legislature knew that suffering and 
death could be prevented. It acted on its 
knowledge. Was it supposed to let Tiny 
Tim die? 
Who could say yes? But was the leg-
islature a good steward? In its first year, 
as Baily and Murray reported, Missis-
sippi's expanded screening identified 
three cases of MCADD "along with 
twelve cases of other new disorders, out 
of a total of 116 newborn screening di-
agnoses." But "to help pay for the ex-
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pansion, the state doubled the [screen-
ing] fee to seventy dollars. This meant 
that a substantial share of the resources 
for expansion came from Mississippi's 
Medicaid funds, since Medicaid covers 
more than half of Mississippi births." 
Around this time, Mississippi's infant 
mortality rate had been increasing, 
"Medicaid eligibility requirements were 
tightened, and some programs were 
cut." 
One county's infant mortality rate, 
however, "fell sharply after a private 
charity began providing intensive in-
home visits using local women as coun-
selors and busing pregnant black 
women to pre- and postnatal classes." If 
resources spent screening had instead 
been spent on such a program, would 
more lives have been saved and more 
suffering averted? When legislators are 
confronted with the tragedy and pas-
sion of a parent like Mr. Haygood, such 
questions are painful and seem point-
less. But if they are not asked, several 
anonymous Tiny Tims may die to save 
one whose story lawmakers hear. 
The American College of Medical 
Genetics proffers a somewhat more sys-
tematic way to make screening policy.2 
Its "expert panel identified 29 condi-
tions for which screening should be 
mandated. An additional 25 conditions 
were identified because they are part of 
the differential diagnosis of a condition 
in the core panel or are clinically signif-
icant and revealed by the screening 
technology but lack an efficacious treat-
ment ... or because there are incidental 
findings for which there is potential 
clinical significance." 
The ACMG report is a stride toward 
more orderly stewardship, and most 
states have implemented a version of the 
report's proposals. But like Mr. Hay-
good, the ACMG has purposes and pas-
sions that lead it to see a world in which 
screening is indispensable. Its report 
does address the issue of cost and bene-
fit, but in such a cautiously qualified 
way that it's hard to embrace its conclu-
sions. Furthermore, the report enthusi-
astically says that "screening is more 
than testing. It is a coordinated and 
comprehensive system consisting of ed-
ucation, screening, follow-up, diagnosis, 
treatment and management, and pro-
gram evaluation." How would a "com-
prehensive system'' affect costs and ben-
efits? Finally, the report does not ask 
whether there are yet more rewarding 
ends to which resources could be put. 
In a recent white paper, the Presi-
dent's Council on Bioethics sees screen-
ing from yet another perspective. 3 It 
finds the cost question harder than the 
ACMG. Few infants actually benefit: 
Of about four million babies screened 
annually, "about 5,000 are identified as 
having serious heritable disorders, most 
of which are, in varying degrees, 
amenable to treatment." And the "ben-
efits and harms involved in each com-
ponent of genetic screening" are "com-
plex and elusive." 
The white paper, however, is primar-
ily interested in "ethical analysis" of 
screening. The white paper "[r]eaffirms 
the essential validity" of the "classical 
principle"-screen only for treatable 
diseases. It believes the ACMG report 
strays from that principle. First, the re-
port favors screening for untreatable 
disorders if screening might produce 
clinically useful information. Second, 
the white paper concludes that the re-
port embraces "a broadened conception of 
benefit that includes ... helping society 
by providing opportunities for biomed-
ical research aimed at understanding the 
natural history of the disorder and find-
ing an effective treatment for it." 
The white paper thus recommends 
mandatory screening "only for those 
disorders that clearly meet" the "treat-
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able" standard. Screening for other dis-
orders "may be offered by the states to 
parents on a voluntary basis under a re-
search paradigm." The "research" 
screening would have to meet two re-
quirements. First, "[p] articipation in 
these pilot studies should require the 
voluntary, informed consent of the in-
fant's parents." Second, "IRB approval 
should be obtained in each state." 
The white paper's perspective, then, 
is essentially that of traditional 
bioethics. It focuses on the interests of 
the patient, fears that research may in-
jure those interests, and treats informed 
consent and IRB review as presumptive-
ly desirable. How does that perspective 
look to the good steward? 
When the state makes screening pol-
icy, it not only allocates its funds; it also 
shapes the way parents employ their 
time, energy, money, and medical ser-
vices. Parents asked to give informed 
consent must devote those resources to 
their education. Were screening all that 
new parents had to learn about, impos-
ing that education on them could make 
sense. But new parents have more press-
ing assignments. When I asked a family 
practice physician where screening 
ranked in his educational priorities for 
new parents, he snorted. He is anxious 
to teach parents to bring newborns in 
for attention when they have a fever, 
not to give babies water, to put babies to 
sleep on their backs, and much else that 
is not obvious and saves lives. 
Requiring parents to spend resources 
learning about screening looks even less 
sensible given the sobering but ever-
mounting evidence that informed con-
sent cannot achieve the goal announced 
for it--equipping people to reason their 
way capably to well-founded and well-
considered medical decisions. And the 
white paper presents evidence that edu-
cation about screening is, if anything, 
particularly ineffective. But of course: 
Teaching and learning are hard. Good 
stewards of educational resources 
choose their battles cautiously. 
The good legislative steward asks an-
other question: If screening is needed, 
how should it be instituted? The issue is 
not whether parents may exempt chil-
dren from screening. It is whether the 
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rule should be that children are 
screened unless their parents opt out, or 
that children are not screened unless 
their parents opt in. A large literature 
tells us that even when people care 
about a decision (like contributing to 
retirement accounts), they frequently 
leave themselves wherever default rules 
put them. 
So which default rule best suits 
screening? That depends on two things. 
First, which rule best reflects parents' 
preferences? That is, which rule is likeli-
est to leave parents where they want to 
be? The white paper shows that given a 
choice, in surveys and in life, almost all 
parents choose screening. So an opt-out 
rule both conserves social and personal 
resources and promotes parents' auton-
omy (by giving them what they want 
without making them ask). 
The second question about defaults 
is which rule best promotes broader so-
cial interests. The arguments for screen-
ing are that it protects newborns and 
their families while promoting valuable 
research. If so, the opt-out rule is again 
preferable. Furthermore, an opt-out 
rule attributes to parents a willingness 
to assist medical research when the risk 
is vanishingly small. That rule assumes 
parents recognize that their families 
benefit from generations of participa-
tion in research and can repay their debt 
by participating in research to help later 
generations. An opt -out rule thus hon-
ors the American tradition Tocqueville 
admired: 
The free institutions which the in-
habitants of the United States pos-
sess, and the political rights of 
which they make so much use, re-
mind every citizen, and in a thou-
sand ways, that he lives in society. 
They every instant impress upon 
his mind the notion that it is the 
duty as well as the interest of men 
to make themselves useful to their 
fellow creatures; and as he sees no 
particular ground of animosity to 
them, since he is never either their 
master or their slave, his heart read-
ily leans to the side of kindness. 
Much law is made in the way the 
Haygood Act apparently exemplifies. A 
story is told that seems to reveal a dread-
ful wrong. Sympathy is won. Indigna-
tion is provoked. An "obvious" solution 
presents itsel£ The legislature adopts the 
solution without systematic argument 
or adequate evidence. For example, a 
federal ban on "drive-through deliver-
ies" was enacted in this way. Congress 
barely discussed the Patient Self Deter-
mination Act's (otiose) requirement that 
information about advance directives be 
offered patients. When the Department 
of Health and Human Services promul-
gated HIPAA, it proffered more anec-
dotes than rationales for aggrandizing 
its authority. The IRB system continues 
to be justified primarily by a rhetoric of 
scandal that has less and less relevance. 
Newborn screening illustrates 
Wilde's mot: "The truth is rarely pure 
and never simple." Facts are elusive and 
ambiguous, yet until they are under-
stood, principles provide little guidance. 
We value good stewardship, but we do 
not know what the real costs and bene-
fits of screening are. The people and 
groups that are interested in policy have 
perspectives of their own. Legitimately. 
Mr. Haygood should think about fami-
lies like his; the ACMG should look to 
genetics to improve health; the Presi-
dent's Council should analyze issues in 
ethical terms. But all these perspectives 
are necessary, and who is to assemble, 
evaluate, and reconcile them? So bad 
money drives out good, and argument 
by anecdote, by scandal, and by outrage 
perpetually threatens to displace the 
burdensome and perplexing business of 
good stewardship. 
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